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Abstract 
Inflation appears to be the macro-problem in Ghana for which no antidote has been 
found under the economic recovery programme. It is possible that either a wrong diagnosis 
has been made of the problem, or that certain factors within the economy are preventing 
inflation from staying within target levels. 
Using an error-correction model (ECM), the paper estimates an inflation equation for 
Ghana. The convenience of this model is in the fact that all the data series exhibit an 
autoregressive scheme of order one: that is they are 1(1) series. In such an instance the 
Granger-Engle Theorem shows that the ECM provides the most efficient model. Further, 
the ECM unveils some of the short-run dynamics which are missing in other estimation 
techniques. The results of the econometric regression showed that inflation in Ghana, in 
either the long run or the short run, is influenced more by output volatility than by monetary 
factors. 
An examination is made of the consistency of fiscal deficits. The hypothesis is that 
an unsustainable fiscal policy would make government miss some macroeconomic targets. 
It is shown that in 1985 and 1989, fiscal policy was consistent. Inflation was well within 
target in 1985. For 1986-1988, the government did not maintain consistent fiscal deficits, 
and inflation in those years was well above targets. 
It is recommended that to control inflation in Ghana, more attention should be paid to 
supply factors. Further, government should pursue consistent fiscal policies. 
I Introduction 
Inflation has been the albatross of Ghana's economic recovery programme (ERP). Since 
the beginning of the programme, the Government of Ghana has made a lot of effort to 
bring inflation under control. Tight monetary and fiscal policies targeted the demand 
causes of inflation. Within a year of the programme, the inflation rate was dropped from 
123% to about 40% and then to 10% percent in 1985. Since then, inflationary rates have 
averaged about 30% per annum, persistently above targets set within the ERP. 
Two major recent studies on Ghana's inflation have identified two different reasons 
for the problem. Chhibber and Shafik (1990) concluded that monetary growth was 
instrumental in determining the pace of inflation in Ghana. They observed that the large 
inflow of external resources over the ERP period has led to a huge expansion of the 
money stock, which in turn has exerted strong demand and inflationary pressures. While 
agreeing that the high pace of monetary expansion has a strong effect on inflation, Sowa 
and Kwakye (1991) observed that the foreign inflows also led to the rehabilitation of 
factories and the import of final goods, which eased the supply pressures as well. Thus, 
Sowa and Kwakye claimed, though money has been expanding at about the same rate in 
the ERP period as before, its influence on inflation has not been that strong. On the other 
hand, they found real factors to be more pronounced in Ghana's inflationary spiral. Figure 
1 demonstrates the relationship. The authors reckoned that by formulating real factors 
as monetary (using Walras' Law), Chhibber and Shafik lost the ability to capture the real 
factors independently and rather accentuated the effect of the monetary factors. Sowa 
and Kwakye further explained that the potency of the real factors is in food production. 
Food accounts for about 50% of the official consumer price index; 1 hence fluctuations in 
food production and price affect the general price level significantly. 
This paper examines why the rates of inflation in Ghana have usually stayed above 
target levels. A trivial answer is that the targets were too optimistic and outside the 
achievable ranges. The paper assumes that the targets were reasonable and examines 
other possible reasons why they were not met. 2 One answer provided by the Sowa and 
Kwakye (1991) study is that inflation is much more influenced by real factors (particularly 
food production), which have so far not been addressed by policy. It can be argued that 
policy effects on the real sector are of a long-run nature and may not be expected to have 
short-run effects on inflation. A weakness of the Sowa and Kwakye (1991) study was its 
inability to capture the short-run dynamics of the inflationary spiral. This study addresses 
this issue by employing an error-correction model to examine inflation in Ghana. 
Another possible reason for the inability of the ERP to bring inflation rates within 
target levels may arise from policy inconsistencies. The main hypothesis is that fiscal 
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Figure 1: Output growth and inflation 
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deficits (broadly defined) 3 over the ERP period are not consistent with macroeconomic 
targets (including inflation) in the programme. In such a situation some of the 
macroeconomic targets like inflation are violated. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the deficit-money-
inflation linkages in Ghana. Section III reformulates an econometric model of inflation 
in Ghana using an error-correction model. Section IV discusses the control measures 
adopted so far and their effectiveness in relation to the targets set. Section V examines 
the consistency of fiscal policy, while the last section summarizes the paper and brings 
out recommendations. 
11 Fiscal deficits, money and inflation 
The theory that links fiscal deficits, money and inflation can be traced through the familiar 
government budget constraint. Consider a situation in which the goal of national policy 
is the closure of a potential GNP gap. Demand management techniques suggest the 
application of a particular fiscal stimulus to close the gap. Such an expansionary fiscal 
policy, without a corresponding increase in tax revenue, leads to an increase in the fiscal 
deficit. There are four ways in which the deficit can be financed: 1) printing money, 2) 
running down foreign reserves, 3) borrowing from abroad, and 4) borrowing from the 
domestic sector. That is, 
Budget deficit = {money printing + foreign reserves + foreign borrowing 
+ domestic borrowing} (1) 
Each of the different ways of financing the deficit has its own problems. For example, 
foreign reserve use can lead to exchange rate crises, while foreign borrowing may lead 
to an external debt problem. The printing of money to finance the deficit may also lead 
to inflation. 
With the exception of money printing, there are limitations on the extent to which a 
government can pursue these financing options. The following sections show the nature 
of fiscal deficits in Ghana and how they have been financed. 
Fiscal deficits 
From the early 1960s, when over-indulgence in modernization and import substitution 
led to excessive government spending, until 1986, the public budget (even narrowly 
defined) registered deficits. Between 1965 and 1985, the narrowly defined deficit averaged 
about 5% of GDP per annum. To finance the deficit, government relied mostly on 
internal borrowing from banks and the non-bank public. 
Before the ERP, reliance on external borrowing to finance Ghana's fiscal deficit was 
negligible. Nkrumah's pride of place as the champion in the fight against neo-colonialism 
prevented his government from seeking budgetary support from the Bretton Woods 
institutions, whose activities he viewed as imperialistic. During the governments of the 
National Liberation Council (NLC, 1966-1969) and the Progress Party (PP, 1969-1972), 
an IMF-sponsored adjustment programme opened the door to external borrowing for 
financing the deficit. In 1970, the deficit was almost fully financed from external 
borrowing. 
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The lean towards external borrowing to finance the deficit was turned in 1972, when 
on taking over power from the Progress Party government, Acheampong's National 
Redemption Council (NRC) repudiated some of Ghana's external debts. Ghana was 
then black-listed in the international financial community. From 1973-1979, and even 
running over to the years of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to the 
People's National Party (PNP), through to the beginning years of the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) (1979-1983), Ghana could raise very little external finance to 
support her deficit. Over these years, government borrowed heavily from the banking 
sector to finance the deficit. The implication of this for the money supply and inflation 
will be examined later. 
Fiscal performance in the ERP period (1983 onwards) has been quite different from 
those of past regimes. Government expenditure has been somehow restrained in both 
real and nominal terms. Several "cost-saving" and "cost-recovery" measures have been 
introduced in most public departments and services. Subsidies on health and education 
have been removed. Hospital fees have been introduced at government hospitals and 
parents are now required to pay more for the education of their wards. Government 
expenditure has consistently been kept at 14% of GDP. As part of the measures to maintain 
the restraint on expenditure, the public sector wage bill has been pegged at 5% of GDP, 
forcing government to retrench public servants. On the revenue side, efforts at tax 
collection have intensified. The tax net has been widened. The restrained government 
spending and the enhanced revenue collection have resulted in the elimination of the 
deficit (narrowly defined) since 1986. 
It is interesting to note the importance of foreign inflows to the Ghana budget in the 
ERP era. International credibility gained by Ghana in her economic turn-around under 
the ERP has translated into external capital inflow, which has supported her budget and 
balance of payments. Since 1986, external support has even helped pay off some internal 
public debt. See columns 7 and 8 of Table 1. 
The effect of fiscal deficits on inflation is usually through the impact of financing on 
the money stock. This issue is examined below. 
Money supply 
Up until 1972, and with the exception of 1964, the growth of the money supply in Ghana 
hardly exceeded the 15% mark set out in the Bank of Ghana Act (1963). The 1964 lunge 
of 39% in monetary growth made inflation surge into double digits from that year on. 
But the distinct era of monetary indiscipline was the 1972-1982 period in which the 
money supply grew at an average of about 40% per annum. A casual look at the sources 
of growth in money shows that a lot of it came from domestic credit creation: basically 
the government was just printing money. 
Over the ERP period, money supply has been growing at the same high average of 
40%. However, the source of growth in money has not been the same as previously. As 
evidenced by the data in Table 2, even though there had been huge leaps in domestic 
credit after 1983, money supply did not expand by as much. This is because, since the 
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External Financing 
Year GDP Revenue Grants Expend. Deficit Domestic Foreign 
1965 1.47 0.30 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.08 0.00 
1970 2.26 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.05 
1975 5.24 0.80 0.00 1.20 0.40 0.40 0.00 
1980 42.85 2.95 0.00 4.80 1.85 1.52 0.29 
1983 184.05 10.20 0.06 15.20 4.95 3.83 0.97 
1984 270.56 21.70 0.91 27.50 4.89 3.03 1.82 
1985 343.05 38.70 1.60 47.90 7.60 4.04 3.52 
1986 511.37 69.80 3.90 73.30 0.40+ 5.32 -5.61 
1987 746.00 105.00 6.00 102.10 8.90+ -2.88 -1.18 
1988 1057.90 142.20 11.60 149.90 3.90+ -6.17 2.26 
1989* 1419.80 193.20 21.30 204.20 10.30+ -15.28 4.93 
1990 1889.00 241.30 28.10 264.30 5.10 -25.07 20.06 
1991 236.00 334.20 34.30 337.46 31.04+ -53.04 22.00 
* World Bank estimates. 
+ Surplus. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, 1990 Yearbook, IMF and Ghana Monetary Survey, World 
(unpublished) 
ERP, expansions in domestic credit have been mitigated by decreases in net foreign 
assets. 
Change in the net foreign assets over the ERP period has come about through two 
channels. First, there has been capital inflow in the form of balance of payments and 
budgetary support loans and grants. These external inflows have augmented the national 
reserves position and, thus, its capacity to increase domestic liquidity. A substantial 
portion of the inflows result in direct cedi-counterpart payments to domestic entities 
(government, public and private organizations, individuals) leading directly to enlargement 
of domestic liquidity. During 1983-1990, gross external inflows averaged more than 
$650 million per annum. Assuming that the same levels of domestic liquidity had been 
fully supported by internal portfolio adjustments, increases in money supply would have 
averaged in excess of 100% over the ERP period. 
The second source of change in the net foreign assets is through the so-called 
"revaluation losses". Revaluation losses comprise losses to government arising from 
revaluation (following exchange rate depreciation) of accrued external commitments -
oil bills, dividends awaiting transfer, current payment arrears, repurchases to the IMF 
and other outstanding loans. 
There has been a lot of argument among central bankers and researchers as to whether 
revaluation losses do, indeed, constitute liquidity injection. The answer lies in how the 
book keeping entries are made for the losses. Consider the balance sheet of the banking 
system as shown in Table 3. When there are changes in the exchange rate, the value of 
the net foreign assets, in cedi terms, changes. For instance, a devaluation will 
Table 2: Changes in money supply and sources of changes (billion cedis) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Money Supply 
1. Currency plus 
demand deposits 0.00 0.02 0.31 1.41 5.52 10.13 11.46 16.85 29.01 37.86 64.36 20.05 15.98 
2. Quasi- money 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.60 0.46 1.02 3.30 5.55 7.84 11.18 20.38 11.84 29.43 
3. Restricted deposits 
and other items 0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.05 1.85 -6.96 -0.99 -3.86 -25.40 -80.66 -65.54 7.22 15.00 
4. Total money supply 0.02 0.09 0.46 1.96 7.83 4.19 13.77 18.54 11.45 -31.62 19.20 39.11 60.41 
Sources of Changes 
5. Net foreign assets -0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.12 -5.77 -12.10 -15.34 -22.77 -74.79 -21.79 -28.27 29.32 54.24 
6. Domestic credit - 0.08 0.02 0.35 2.08 13.60 16.29 29.10 41.32 86.24 -9.83 47.44 9.82 5.92 
a. to central government 
(net) 0.06 -0.02 0.34 1.62 16.99 9.41 10.59 28.54 80.34 -8.69 -38.33 9.36 -32.38 
b. to nonfinancial public 
& other financial inst. -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.33 -4.67 3.75 13.82 4.89 0.92 -10.61 35.94 -11.38 15.52 
c. to private sector 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.14 1.28 3.14 4.68 7.89 4.98 9.47 49.83 11.84 22.78 
7. Total sources 0.03 0.08 0.48 1.96 7.83 4.19 13.76 18.55 11.45 -31.62 19.17 39.14 60.16 
Note: Total changes in money supply may not be equal to total changes in sources, due to rounding. 
Source: Computed from International Financial Statistics, 1990 Yearbook and September 1992 issue, IMF. 
POLICY CONSISTENCY AND INFLATION IN GHANA 
Table 3: Balance sheet of the banking system 
7 
Central bank Commercial banks Banking system 
Assets Assets Assets 
Net foreign assets 
Credit to government 
Reserves 
Credit to private sector 
Net foreign assets 
Credit to government 
Liabilities Liabilities Laibilities 
Currency 
Commercial bank reserves 
Net worth 
Demand deposits 
Time deposits 
Currency 
Demand deposits 
Time deposits 
Net worth 
cause a decrease in the cedi value of the net foreign assets. 4 This change can be posted to 
the balance sheet in three different ways. The central bank can either: 
1. Consider it as a liability of government and hence debit the government account; 
2. Create a pseudo-asset account and post in all the losses; or 
3. Change the net worth on the liability side to match up the change in net foreign 
It is clear that only the third method will have an effect on the money supply, since the 
first and second methods will leave both total assets and total liabilities unaffected. On 
the other hand, if the third method had been adopted, the net worth of the central bank 
would have been completely wiped out and the country would have been bankrupt. 
Further, since the country's net worth does not automatically decrease by devaluation, 
one can rule out the third option. Hence, one can conveniently assume that the revaluation 
losses do not directly affect the money stock. The choice between the other two options 
is reduced to the question of who bears the revaluation losses - the central bank or the 
cental government. 
The second accounting method was used in Ghana until September 1990. That is, 
instead of being charged to the account of the government, whose liability they were, the 
losses were allowed to accumulate in a pseudo-asset account at the Bank of Ghana. With 
the massive exchange rate depreciation from 2.75 cedis to the US dollar in 1983 to more 
than 350 cedis to the dollar in 1990, the losses increased substantially, reaching some 
311 billion cedis by September 1990.5 
In September 1990 the Bank of Ghana changed its accounting to the first method, 
whereby government's account is debited with the losses. The government issued long-
term securities to the Bank of Ghana to cover the accrued losses as of September 1990. 
Only interest payments (nominally fixed at 4% ) were to be charged to the budget. 
Since 1990 government has managed to keep the growth in money supply at a minimal 
assets. 
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rate. From Table 2, it can be seen that in 1990 the credit squeeze was on public enterprises 
while in 1991 it was on central government. The private sector has somehow escaped 
the squeeze. This may be in line with the government objective under the structural 
adjustment programme (SAP-2) to promote private sector initiatives. 
In sum, though growth in money under the ERP has averaged about the same rate as 
before the programme started, the source of the change has been different. Changes in 
net foreign assets have influenced changes in money under the ERP period. Capital 
inflow usually brings with it the ability to purchase necessary imports for promotion of 
domestic output. The increase in prices due to the increased liquidity under the NFA 
injection may thus have been muffled by increased supply of goods and services. The 
effect of changes in money on inflation then becomes an empirical issue. 
Ill An error correction model of inflation 
Time-series properties of data on most African economies are not very satisfactory. In 
most instances, the data series are not stationary. Thus, most of the classical assumptions 
for econometric estimation and forecasting are violated. In such instances, econometric 
results may not be ideal for policymaking. Further, in cases where the data series exhibit 
the presence of unit roots, short-run dynamic properties of the model can only be captured 
in an error-correction model, when we have demonstrated the existence of cointegration 
(Engle and Granger, 1987). 
Suppose inflation is a simple function of nominal money (M), real income (y), and 
the parallel rate (b). In other words, the inflation equation is taken just as an inverse 
demand for money equation. In defining nominal balances, base money is considered 
the more appropriate monetary aggregate since it can be theoretically shown to be the 
driving force behind inflation (Anand and van Wijnberger, 1989). Studies into demand 
for money in Ghana have shown that the rate of interest is not a significant explanatory 
variable (see, for example, Sowa, 1991). For most years after independence, real rates 
of interest in Ghana have been negative. In recent years, however, the real exchange rate 
has featured as an indication of the opportunity cost for holding money. During periods 
of high inflation people switch from holding money to real assets, with the rate of inflation 
being a determinant of the rate of trade-off. Thus, the inflation function is specified as 
pt ~ 0(Mt, yt, b) (2) 
Log-linearizing Equation 2, we can write the long-run inflation equation as: 
pt = a0 + atyt + o,M, + api + w, (3) 
where u is an error term that is assumed normally distributed and of mean zero and 
all other variables are as defined above. 
Theory demands that the partial derivatives of price with respect to money stock and 
exchange rate be positive. However, since an increase in output eases the demand 
pressure, inflation is supposed to be a decreasing function of output. 
Empirical analysis of the inflation model is based on data obtained from various 
issues of the Quarterly Digest of Statistics of the Ghana Statistical Services Quarterly. 
The data on parallel market exchange rates were obtained from Ernesto May (1984) and 
updated with data compiled by the author. The data series covered the period 1963 to 
1990. 
A test of the time-series properties of the data showed that all the variables have unit 
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roots. That is, the auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) functions of the variables are of 
1(1) series. This implies that the variables are non-stationary and hence may exhibit 
some spurious correlations. On the other hand, a test for cointegration using the Dickey-
Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Sargan-Bhargava-Durbin-Watson 
(SBDW) tests revealed that the residual in Equation 3 is of 1(0) series. In other words, 
inflation is co-integrated with output, money and the parallel market exchange rate. 
Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to Equation 3 yields the long-run regression results: 
pt = 2.0418 - 0.7091yt + 0.6641M, + 0.4297b( (4) 
(2.060) (0.389) (0.282) (0.040) 
R2 = .997; a= .1556; F(3,27) = 3019.61 [.0000]; DW = 1.19 
The standard errors of the estimates are shown under them in parentheses. The high 
F-statistic and R-squared indicate the joint significance of the explanatory variable and 
the high degree to which variations in the rate of inflation are explained by variations in 
output, real balances and the parallel rate. The DW indicates a strong case of serial 
correlation, brought on apparently by the lack of any lag structure in the model. All the 
parameters have the right signs. Note also that the Durbin-Watson statistic is above the 
critical level of 1.10, and therefore accepts cointegration by the SBDW test. 
The result in Equation 4 suggests that in the longrun there is not much significant 
difference in the effects of money and output on inflation, although output has an edge. 
This agrees with the monetarist argument on the power of monetary factors in the long-
run inflationary process. 
To capture the short-run dynamics of inflation, we impose lag structures on the 
cointegration equation in 3. Since the variables are co-integrated, by the Granger-Engle 
Representation theorem, an error-correction model (ECM) will present the most efficient 
estimation. We therefore formulate an over-parameterized inflation model as: 
Ap =fi0 +J3jApil + fi7Api2 +fi3Ay + fi4Aytl + fi5Ayi2 +fi6AM:l + 
fi7AM,2 +fi8Ab^, +fi9Ab/2 +fi10Uhatl_l + £ (6) 
Uhatt! is the error-correction factor and e is a serially uncoiTelated disturbance term. 
The initial run of the over-parameterized model using OLS is presented in Appendix 1. 
The F-statistic (=5.66 [.0012]) implies the acceptance of the hypothesis of joint 
significance of the explanatory variables at the 1% significance level, against the null of 
non-significance. The lack of significant difference between the "ordinary" standard 
errors and the heteroscedastic consistent standard errors (HCSE) indicates the near 
homoscedasticity of the errors. 
In an attempt to work towards a more parsimonious equation, variables with low t-
statistics in the over-parameterized regression were dropped. The regression results of 
the restricted model are presented in Table 4. Notice the fall in the Schwarz Criterion 
from -3.14 in the over-parameterized model in Appendix 1 to -3.76 in the restricted 
model in Table 4. This implies that the information content in the latter model is more 
than in the former. The model has nice statisticla properties: the distribution of the errors 
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Table 4: An error-correction model of inflation 
11 
Modelling Ap by RLS 
The sample is 1963 to 1990 less 0 forecasts 
Ax (t) = x (t) - x (t-1) 
Variable Coefficient Std error HCSE t-value Partial R2 
Dp (-2) .2079338 .11753 .1881 1.76921 .1246 
Dy -.9674815 .21213 .27081 -4.56074 .4860 
DM .4401239 .12459 .14453 3.53244 .3619 
Db .1549926 .08213 .13191 1.88712 .1393 
Uhat (-1) -.4448553 .17366 .16770 -2.56169 .2298 
CONSTANT .0625357 .04155 .05115 1.50501 0.933 
R2 = .7761003 s = .1204159 F(5,22) = 15.25 [ .0000] DW = 1.751 
RSS = .3189995106 for 6 variables and 28 observations 
Information criteria: SC = -3.760726; HQ = -3.958927; FPE = .0176 
R2 Relative to DIFFERENCE+SEASONALS = .78339 
is normal and they do not exhibit any serial correlation.5 The F-statistic indicates that the 
explanatory variables are jointly significant. Both output and money are significant 
explanatory variables of the inflationary spiral in Ghana. On the other hand, the parallel 
exchange rate does not have a significant effect on inflation. This confirms ealier findings 
by both Sowa and Kwakye (1991) and Chhibber and Shafik (1990). Each parameter also 
carries the right sign. Note that the error correction term [Uhat(-l)] is significant, 
confirming our earlier assertion that the variables are cointegrated. There is a 44% feedback 
from the previous period into the short-run dynamic process. 
In the short run, output seems to have a significantly stronger effect on inflation than 
does money. The inflation elasticity with respect to output is almost unity, indicating that 
for each percentage increase in output inflation falls by about the same percentage. Such 
significant drops were witnessed in Ghana in 1985 and 1991 when there were bumper 
harvests. Money, on the other hand, does not seem to exert much influence in the short 
run. The low coefficients on money indicate the absence of scale economies in the use of 
monetary policy to fight inflation in the short run. For each percentage reduction in the 
rate of inflation sought, the money supply will have to be reduced more than 
proportionately. 
However, the regression results of the error-correction model should be interpreted 
with caution. For each factor, there are direct and indirect determinants of the time-path 
of their effects on inflation. For example, a change in output (y) affects on the time-path 
as follows: 
1. The direct impacts of a change in y on inflation are given by (1, in the ECM 
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Equation 6 and the coefficients on the lagged output variables. 
2. The indirect effects are of two kinds: 
a. The lagged dependent variable in the ECM equation means that a shock to y 
will have additional effects on inflation in periods t+1, t+2,.... given by B3B t, 
B^B2,,... and similarly for effects coming through the lagged outputs. 
b) The second indirect impact comes through the error-correction term, and 
therefore depends on the relative size of the direct effects of y in the cointegration 
and eiTor- correction equations. This effect is given by (B 3-a,)B 1 0, B4B10,... 
Thus, from our regression results above, we can calculate the total short-run impacts 
as follows: 
Impact Output Money 
Direct -0.9675 0.4401 
Indirect (a) -0.2012 0.0915 
(b) -0.1149 0.0996 
Total -1.2836 0.6312 
In sum, working through the short-run dynamics shows that the effect of output on Ghana's 
inflationary spiral is more pronounced than the monetary effect. As a long-run 
phenomenon, however, there is not much significant difference between the impact of 
output and the impact of money. 
Thus, to keep inflation under control, more attention should be paid to policies that 
will enhance growth in real output. Any anti-inflationary policy that neglects the supply 
side is not likely to be successful. A first clue as to why Ghana has been missing its 
inflation targets could be that not enough attention has been paid to the supply side, 
which is more subject to the vagaries of the weather. 
In the next section we examine some of the policies that have been pursued so far, 
and their effect on inflation in Ghana. 
IV Inflationary targets and control in Ghana 
Since the inception of the ERP in 1983, a number of policies have been directed at 
reducing the level of inflation in Ghana. These policies, designed to stabilize an economy 
in serious disequilibrium, included fiscal, monetary and income policies. Fiscal 
management - in terms of improved tax administration and restrictions on government 
spending involving removal of subsidies on some goods and services - and cost recovery 
and cost saving effort were applied in order to reduce the huge deficit build-up. From a 
low of 6% of GDP in 1983, total revenue (inclusive of external grants) increased to 
about 15% in 1987 and has maintained that ratio since. On the expenditure side, there 
has been an increase from about 8% of GDP in 1983 to about 14% in 1987. Thus, by 
1986 the budget deficit was eliminated. 
Though the deficit was eliminated, government never let loose the rein on monetary 
control. Tight monetary policy was maintained. Interest rates were steadily increased 
administratively until 1989 when the market was allowed to determine the rates. Banks 
were asked to restrain their issue of advances (Sowa, 1991). In spite of these attempts, 
money supply continued to grow at an average of about 40% per annum over the ERP 
period - but as explained above, the source of growth of money in the ERP period has 
been foreign inflows. 
Inflation does seem to have shown some response to the policy initiatives. From a 
high level of 123% in 1983, the rate of inflation dropped to just about 37% in 1990, with 
an ERP low of 10% in 1985.6 In spite of these reductions, however, inflation has 
usually stayed above targets set within the recovery programme. 
There is no evidence of inflationary targets being set in Ghana in the pre-ERP period. 
During the ERP, targets were normally set and presented in the policy framework papers 
(PFPs) prepared and agreed upon by the Government of Ghana, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. Table 5 presents data on actual and target values for inflation 
and growth of real gross domestic product. There are also data on external debt-GDP 
ratios. 
Inflation has for most of the ERP period stayed above target. Between 1984 and 
1991, the rate of inflation was within target only three times while output was within 
target five times. It is quite clear that both output and inflation in Ghana are influenced 
by the weather. The years when output fell short of target were mostly years of partial 
drought, particularly 1983/84 and 1989/90. Inflation was also within target mostly during 
years of good weather and good harvest. In 1984/85 and 1991 gluts in production caused 
food prices to fall. 
The puzzle is that, given the significant influence that output has on inflation, and 
given the good growth performance of GDP during the ERP period, inflation was 
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Table 5: Actual and programmed GDP growth and inflation (percent) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Inflation 
Target 40.6 25.6 20.0 15.0 21.8 20.0 15.0 20.0 
Actual 39.7 10.3 24.6 39.8 31.4 25.2 37.2 18.0 
Deviation 0.9 15.3 -4.6 -24.8 -9.6 -5.2 -22.2 2.0 
Real GDP growth 
Target 7.6 4.0 4.3 4.2 5.5 6.0 4.8 4.5 
Actual 2.6 5.1 5.2 4.8 6.2 5.1 3.3 5.0 
Deviation 5.0 -1.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 0.9 1.5 -0.5 
Debt/GDP Ratio 44.6 50.3 48.9 66.3 58.0 55.4 56.3 57.7 
Source: World Bank, Ghana: Policy Framework Paper (several Issues); World Bank, Ghana: 
Towards Structural Adjustment (1985); World Bank, World Debt Tables (1991 -1992). 
not brought within target. For instance, between 1986-1988, output performed better 
than programmed and yet inflation stayed above target levels. It is worth noting that in 
those years the agricultural sector generally, and food production in particular, did not 
perform well. 7 
The deviation from macroeconomic targets may be explained by lack of consistency 
in policy formulation. In making projections and preparing targets, the Ghanaian 
authorities and the Bretton Woods institutions rely on a five-sector flow-of-funds model 
"to ensure consistency between the current and capital accounts of the public, monetary 
and private sectors, the balance of payments, and the national accounts" (World Bank, 
1985, p. 111). The consistency of the targets set for the various sectors ties into the 
government budget constraint. In other words, consistency of targets hinges on the 
maintenance of a sustainable government budget deficit. 
V Fiscal policy consistency 
The analytical framework in this section draws extensively on the work of Anand and 
van Wijnbergen (1989). 8 The analysis starts with the government budget constraint and 
shows the restrictions it imposes on various macroeconomic targets, including inflation. 
Earlier theoretical analysis of the importance of the government budget constraint in 
macro-equilibrium can be found in Blinder and Solow (1973), Phelps (1973), Dornbusch 
(1977), Sargent and Wallace (1982), and Buiter (1983a,b). Our earlier discussion also 
established the relation between the government budget constraint and inflation. 
The basic idea is that there must be consistency between fiscal deficits and other 
macroeconomic targets. From Equation 1, we notice that fiscal deficits can be financed 
through internal or external borrowing or through the printing of money. "Macroeconomic 
targets, such as target inflation rate, imply restrictions on these sources of financing 
which then determine financeable deficit. If the actual deficit exceeds the financeable 
deficit, one or more of the macroeconomic targets will not be met without fiscal 
adjustment" (Anand and van Wijnbergen, 1989, p. 18). In other words, macro targets, 
including inflation, should be consistent with a sustainable fiscal deficit. 
The fiscal deficit is made up of the non-interest deficit, that is the excess of expenditure 
over revenue, plus interest payments on domestic and foreign debt. This is financed 
through running down reserves, borrowing from internal and external sources, and printing 
money. Thus the government budget constraint, as in Equation 1, can be expressed as, 
D + iB + i{Bf -NFAf)E = AB + (ABf-ANFAf)E + AM (5) 
where, 
D = non-interest deficit in cedis 
i = nominal domestic interest rate 
B = domestic debt in cedis 
if = nominal foreign interest rate 
Bf = foreign debt in dollars 
NFAf = net foreign assets in dollars 
E = exchange rate (cedis/dollars) 
M = nominal money stock 
(A) denotes change in the variable over time 
Thus, the left-hand side of Equation 5 lists the expenses of the public sector as the current 
deficit plus interest payments to creditors. The right-hand side shows the sources of 
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finance as new debt raised, running down on reserves and printing of money. 
It has been argued by some researchers (e.g., Anand and van Wijnbergen, 1989), that 
the deficit should be defined exhaustively to include central and local government and 
public enterprises, as well as the central bank. 9 Data limitations for Ghana, however, 
prevent such an exhaustive definition. In a situation where the local governments and 
public enterprises depend heavily on central government subvention, there is not much 
that one is giving away by relying solely on the central government budget. In the case 
of the central bank, its profits from the printing of money are treated as a source of 
financing the public budget deficit (Fischer and Easterly, 1990, p. 130). On the issue of 
revaluation losses, since 1990 government has accepted it as its liability and has been 
charging interest payments on it to the deficit. These limitations bias our analysis of 
government deficit towards sustainability. 
Equation 5 can be written in real terms as, 
cl + rb + r/bf - nfaf)e = Ab + (AbfAnfaf)e + (AM/P) (6) 
The lower case letters denote real variables. P is the general price level; e (=EPIP) 
defines the real exchange rate; and m (-MIP) is the real money stock (base money). The 
real interest rate r is defined as, 
r = (1 + i)/( 1 + k) -1, where n is the inflation rate. 
Note that (AM/P) = Am + mn. Thus, Equation 6 can be re-written as 
d + rb + r}(bf-nfaf)e = Ab + (Ab^AnfaJe + Am + mn (7) 
In Equation 7, the real fiscal deficit equals changes in the real value of domestic and 
foreign debt, plus revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax. It is clear that an increased 
deficit will have to be financed by increased interest-bearing debt and seigniorage revenue. 
Sometimes a government may wish to reduce its debt through high inflation rates. 
This is because as inflation rates rise, the value of the stock of existing debt falls. Notice 
from Equation 6 that the inflation tax may also increase, helping to make the fiscal debt 
sustainable. However, there is a trade-off between inflation and seigniorage revenue. 
Fischer and Easterly (1990) postulate a Laffer curve situation in which seigniorage revenue 
rises as inflation rises until it reaches a maximum, and thereafter declines with every 
increase in the rate of inflation. This is because as inflation increases there is an increased 
demand for base money (basically, currency). But beyond some point the demand for 
base money declines as the inflation rate rises. 
Using recursive least squares (RLS), Equation 8 shows the seigniorage revenue-
inflation trade-off for Ghana. 
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Am = 0.1188 - 0.3416K (8) 
(0.0916) (0.0441) 
R2=0.3398; F(1,27)= 13.90 [.0009]; DW = 2.36 
The trade-off shows a decreasing function, with seigniorage revenue dropping by 34.16% 
for each percentage increase in the rate of inflation. From the graph in Figure 1, it is 
clear that for inflation rates above 40%, there is no seigniorage gain at all - in fact 
government starts to lose on seiniorage revenue. This result seems to support the converse 
of the argument that "...if inflation elasticity of base money demand is below unity in 
absolute value then higher inflation will increase real seigniorage" (Buiter, 1985, reprinted 
in Buiter, 1990, p.57). If the inflation equations in Section III are treated as inverse 
money demand functions, then the results indicate inflation elasticity of base money 
demand to be above unity. 
Under the assumption that government keeps to a constant debt-output ratio as a 
strategy, real domestic debt cannot grow faster than real output and real net foreign debt 
cannot grow faster than the ratio of output to the real exchange rate (Anand and van 
Wijnbergen, 1989, p. 27). That is, 
Ab = gb, and A(bf- nfaf)e = (g - e)(bf- nfaf), 
where g is the growth rate in the economy and e is the percentage change in the real 
exchange rate. Also, in a steady state, the percentage increase in the demand for real 
balances must be equal to the growth rate of the economy. Using these assumptions in 
equation 7 yields, 
d + rb + r}(b-nfaf)e = gb + (g-e)(bf-nfaf) + gm + mn (9) 
Thus for a given debt strategy, Equation 9 calculates the value of fiscal deficit consistent 
with a target growth rate in the economy and inflation. Because of the lack of sufficient 
published data on Ghana, especially for the later years of the ERP where our interest lies, 
we had to rely mostly on estimates (especially by the World Bank) in our calculations. 
The results presented in Table 6 should therefore be taken as indicative rather than 
definitive. 
In checking for fiscal consistency, actual and financeable deficits were compared. 
Fiscal policy is consistent if the actual is less than or equal to the financeable deficit, the 
latter being on the set targets. 
In 1989, the total deficit was about -0.73% of GDP; it was negative because the 
budget recorded a surplus in that year. In that year also government reduced its liability 
to domestic creditors by about 3.96% of GDP. Through inflation tax, government gained 
about 2.88% of GDP. Thus net financing of the deficit from domestic sources amounted 
to about 1.08% of GDP. External financing in 1989 amounted to 0.35% of GDP. 
The calculation of the financeable deficit has been based on the three ways of financing 
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Table 6: Actual and financeable deficit for Ghana as percent of GDP 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
ACTUAL 
Seigniorage (Am) 1.87 1.85 2.85 -2.41 0.37 2.29 
Change in domestic debt (Ab) -4.37 -1.73 -4.96 -1.87 -3.97 -6.25 
Change in domestic liabilities -2.50 0.12 -2.11 -4.29 -3.60 -3.96 
Inflation tax (rem) 3.60 1.08 3.15 3.90 3.02 2.88 
Total domestic financing 1.10 1.20 1.04 -0.39 -0.58 -1.08 
External financing 0.70 1.00 -1.10 -0.25 0.21 0.35 
Total deficit (actual) 1.80 2.20 -0.06 -0.64 -0.37 -0.73 
FINANCEABLE 
Seigniorage (gm) 0.69 0.42 0.55 0.41 0.53 0.69 
Change in domestic debt (gb) 0.84 0.44 0.48 0.31 0.26 0.24 
Inflation tax (rem) 3.68 2.68 2.56 1.47 2.09 2.29 
Domestic financing (target) 5.21 3.54 3.60 2.19 2.88 3.21 
Foreign financing (g-£) b, -10.93 -0.76 -8.08 -20.00 -6.96 -1.36 
Total financing (target) -5.71 2.78 -4.48 -17.81 -4.08 1.86 
Actual less financeable 7.51 -0.58 4.42 17.17 3.71 -2.59 
Note: In calculating the actual deficit, change in domestic debt was treated as a residual. 
All computations were based on figures obtained from the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics, the World Bank's World Debt Tables, and World Bank estimates on monetary 
survey in Ghana (unpublished). Target values are as in Table 5. 
the deficit. We have assumed that, during the economic turmoil in Ghana, the nation's 
external reserves were depleted. In that case, as far as the external financing is concerned, 
our focus should be on the net changes in the country's external debt position. In 1989, 
the total external debt was programmed at 55.4% of GDP. However, since the real 
exchange rate depreciated by about 8.5% at a planned output growth rate of 6%, the net 
resource realizable from external sources diminished by 1.36% of GDP. 
On the domestic front, money that could be raised from printing of currency -
seigniorage plus inflation tax - amounted to about 2.98% of GDP, based on programmed 
output growth of 6% and inflation rate of 25.2%. Again, based on the same growth in 
output, new domestic debt that can be raised should amount to about 0.24% of GDP. In 
sum, the total financeable deficit based on target values, as programmed under Ghana's 
structural adjustment programme for 1989, amounted to 1.86% of GDP. Since the 
financeable deficit was larger than the actual deficit, it can be concluded that fiscal policy 
in 1989 was consistent with targets set within the adjustment programme. 
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A similar exercise was carried out for the first six years of the adjustment programme 
(1984-1989); the results are presented in Table 6. Notice that with the exception of 1985 
and 1989, fiscal policy was not consistent in the other years. It is interesting that in 1985 
actual inflation was better than target by about 15 percentage points. Output in that year 
also exceeded target. It is equally surprising that in 1989, though policy was deemed 
consistent, both inflation and output were below their target values. 1 0 
A clear indication of the consequence of policy inconsistency on inflation was given 
by events in 1986-1988. In those years, though output growth exceeded target values, 
inflation rates were very much above expectation. Notice from Table 6 that in those 
years government relied heavily on inflation tax to finance the deficit. 
VI Conclusion 
There is evidence that inflation in Ghana is engineered more by real factors than by 
monetary factors. Shortages in output, particularly food, are likely to cause volatile 
swings in the general price level. This is particularly so in the short run. In the long run, 
though the output effect is more pronounced, the monetary factors are also quite 
significant. 
Changes in money supply under the ERP have been at about the same high average of 
around 40% as before the programme, thus giving rise to the suspicion of inflation being 
a monetary phenomenon. However, since the source of growth in money under the 
adjustment programme has been from external inflows, these would have generated 
resources to ease supply pressures. Thus, the monetary pressures cannot explain the 
short-run price increases in the ERP era. 
The fact that the control policies pursued so far have placed a greater emphasis on 
monetary factors to the neglect of supply factors may explain why they have been 
ineffective. 
Another possible reason why inflation may have stayed above target values is because 
of policy inconsistency. Fiscal policy in Ghana was consistent with the set targets only 
in 1985 and 1989 in the ERP era. In 1985, inflation was well within target. For 1986-
1988, when policy was deemed inconsistent, inflation was very much above target. 
An important result of our analysis was that government does not gain much from 
seigniorage revenue with high rates of inflation. Any inflation rate above the 40% mark 
yields a negative seigniorage revenue. 
It is recommended that for effective control of inflation, the government of Ghana 
should maintain a sustainable fiscal deficit. Government should continue to keep the 
growth of the money supply in check, especially given the likely long-run impact of 
uncontrolled monetary growth. As a matter of urgency government should initiate policies 
that will increase output supply. It is important to note that a high output growth rate 
would encourage the attainment of the consistency criterion. In extreme cases of 
problematic inflationary situations, government should initiate interim policies such as 
food importation to supplement local supply. 
Appendix 
Append ix 1: An over-parameterized ECM model for inflation 
Modelling Ap by OLS 
The sample is 1963 to 1990 less 0 Forecasts 
Variable Coefficient STD Error HCSE t-Value Partial R 2 
Ap (-1) .1982577 .31094 .27576 .63761 .0264 
Ap(-2) .1561642 .23847 .22448 .65485 .0278 
Ay -.9871174 .25949 .26369 -3.80402 .4910 
Ay (-1) .4479612 .42878 .43090 1.04473 .0678 
Ay (- 2 ) - .1628079 .41418 .33075 -.39308 .0102 
AM0 .3261670 .17401 .17245 1.87441 .1898 
AM0(-1) .0325316 .24797 .18799 .13119 . 0011 
AM0(-2) .0791714 .29508 .21369 .26831 .0048 
Ab1 .1583376 .14441 .14136 1.09646 .0742 
Ab1(-1) .0428733 .12683 .13856 .33803 .0076 
Ab1 (-2) - .1326038 .11256 .10961 -1.17811 .0847 
Uhat(-1) - .3998382 .27257 .19644 -1.46692 .1255 
CONSTANT .0437617 .05817 .05562 .75232 .0364 
R 2 = .8190697 o = .1310926 F(12,15) = 5.66 [ .0012] D W = 1.866 
RSS = .2577792357 for 13 variables and 28 observations 
Information Criteria: SC = -3.1408; HQ = -3.5702; FPE = .0252 
R 2 relative to DIFFERENCE+SEASONALS = .82496 
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Appendix 2: Indicators of fiscal performance, 1965-1988 (ratios) 
Financing as ratio of deficit 
As Ratio of GDP Internal Bank of External 
Year Revenue Expend. Deficit loans Ghana loans 
1965 0.19 0.26 0.06 0.88 n.a. 0.03 
1966 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.87 n.a. 0.34 
1967 0.17 0.23 0.06 .0.76 n.a. 0.19 
1968 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.71 n.a. 0.27 
1969 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.65 n.a. 0.41 
1970 0.19 0.22 0.02 0.90 n.a. 0.96 
1971 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.82 n.a. 0.27 
1972 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.49 0.08 0.51 
1973 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.90 0.83 0.10 
1974 0.13 0.17 0.04 1.01 0.94 0.01 
1975 0.15 0.23 0.08 1.00 1.51 0.00 
1976 0.13 0.25 0.11 1.00 0.88 0.00 
1977 0.10 0.20 0.09 0.99 1.36 0.01 
1978 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.91 0.22 0.04 
1979 0.10 0.17 0.07 1.00 0.21 -
1980 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.84 1.78 0.16 
1981 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.92 0.38 0.08 
1982 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.91 0.14 0.08 
1983 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.78 0.09 0.20 
1984 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.63 0.49 0.37 
1985 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.53 0.27 0.46 
1986 0.14 0.14 0.00 17.78 0.60 18.78 
1987 0.15 0.14 0.01 + 0.32 0.66 0.13 
1988 0.15 0.14 0.01 + 0.62 0.64 0.23 
1989 0.15 0.14 0.01 + 
1990 0.14 0.14 0.00 
1991 0.16 0.14 0.02+ 
+ Budget surplus. 
Source: Computed from International Financial Statistics, 1993 Yearbook, IMF, and from 
Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Ghana Statistical Service, March 1989. Data for 1989-1991 
obtained from World Bank Monetary Survey (unpublished). 
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Appendix 3: Growth in money, its components and price (percent) 
Year Base Narrow Broad Currency Demand Quasi- Reserve CPI 
money money money with pub. deposit money money 
1961 0.0 9.7 8.8 0.0 27.7 3.8 0.0 6.2 
1962 19.6 12.2 14.9 10.3 15.0 29.6 100.0 5.9 
1963 -6.9 4.8 7.5 2.1 8.7 20.0 -50.0 5.6 
1964 51.9 39.3 37.2 36.7 42.7 28.6 200.0 15.8 
1965 -9.8 -0.4 1.7 -11.9 14.0 11.1 0.0 22.7 
1966 6.1 3.3 5.0 -0.8 7.4 11.7 33.3 14.8 
1967 1.9 -2.8 1.3 2.6 -7.6 16.4 0.0 -9.7 
1968 3.8 7.5 10.3 5.0 9.9 19.2 0.0 10.7 
1969 21.7 12.0 10.5 20.6 3.8 6.5 25.0 6.5 
1970 21.3 5.5 9.8 2.0 9.4 22.2 80.0 3.0 
1971 -1.2 4.9 11.2 4.5 5.3 27.3 -11.1 8.8 
1972 45.9 44.2 40.6 50.0 38.4 33.1 37.5 10.8 
1973 25.5 21.8 18.9 12.3 32.3 12.2 54.5 17.1 
1974 32.5 23.6 26.6 38.1 10.0 33.9 23.5 18.8 
1975 52.3 44.8 38.0 36.3 54.7 22.7 81.0 29.8 
1976 40.9 41.6 37.2 45.9 37.2 25.4 34.2 55.4 
1977 57.5 67.5 60.0 69.9 64.8 37.3 39.2 116.5 
1978 89.5 72.4 68.6 83.6 59.7 54.4 100.0 73.1 
1979 19.1 13.4 15.8 20.0 4.8 25.6 17.6 54.5 
1980 30.6 30.0 33.7 42.3 11.6 47.4 10.8 50.2 
1981 52.3 54.7 51.5 52.8 58.4 40.9 51.4 116.5 
1982 18.2 19.0 23.3 17.2 22.3 38.5 20.4 22.3 
1983 48.0 49.2 40.3 57.1 35.3 12.7 28.8 122.8 
1984 72.2 60.6 53.6 60.8 60.3 24.9 101.8 39.7 
1985 33.9 42.7 46.2 38.7 50.8 64.6 23.9 10.3 
1986 60.3 44.0 47.9 49.3 34.0 66.0 85.7 24.6 
1987 12.2 52.6 53.3 23.2 114.6 56.2 -8.3 39.8 
1988 36.7 45.0 46.3 39.8 51.3 51.3 28.9 31.4 
1989 56.7 52.7 54.7 44.6 61.9 61.8 89.4 25.2 
1990 1.5 10.8 13.3 2.7 18.8 22.2 -0.9 37.2 
1991 13.6 7.7 16.7 8.3 7.2 45.1 24.8 18.0 
Source: International Financial Statistics, 1988 Yearbook, and September 1992, Quarterly 
Issue, IMF. 
Notes 
1 The Ghana Living Standards Survey (1988) reports that food accounts for 65% 
of household expenditure. 
2 The assumption of credible targets for inflation simplifies the analysis. 
3 The narrow (broader) definition of the deficit includes (excludes) external grants. 
4 Since the country's external commitments reduce its external assets, a devalua-
tion that causes an increase in the cedi value of these external commitments will 
lead to a reduction in the net external assets. 
5 a). Testing for serial correlation from lags 1 to 2 
X2 ( 2) = .707 and F-Form (2, 20) = .26 [ .7743] 
b). Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedastic test: 
Residuals scaled by . 1204D+00 
CNST 1 LAG 
COEFF. .9735 -.2791 
S.E.'s .2582 .2364 
RSS = .20552D+02 a = 1.01370 
X2 ( 1)= 1.759 with F(l,20) = 1.39 [ .2517] 
c). x 2 test for normality: x 2 (2) = .966 
6 Since 1991, point-to-point averages of inflation have been very low (below 20%). 
This will lead to reduction in the annual averages for 1991-1992. It is not clear 
whether the reduction is due to the effect of policy, especially since money stock 
grew at just about 1.5% and 10% for 1990 and 1991, respectively. We should 
also note that 1991 was a good harvest year. 
7 See Jebuni, Sowa and Tutu (1991) for a breakdown of output growth. 
8 For other works on the sustainability of the deficit, refer to Buiter (1983a, 1983b, 
1985), Miller (1982) and Zee (1988). For an African country, see the work on 
Tanzaqia by Rutayisire (1987). 
9 For a comprehensive treatment of different ways of measuring the deficit, see 
Buiter (1985) or Wetzel (forthcoming). 
10 It should be noted that in 1989, government "freed" interest rates, but it is 
possible that since the growth rate of output was more than the real interest rate, 
a kind of "Ponzi game" ensued. That is, government kept on financing existing 
debt service by further borrowing without insolvency (Buiter, 1985). 
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